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“My research in Kenya suggested that these poor families had always been able to afford private schools. 
Before free primary education, they were already in private schools. The real conundrum for me was why the 
development experts hadn’t already figured this out.” 
—James Tooley, 2009, p. 125. 
Introduction 
Education policy in the developing world has focused on expanding access to government-operated 
schools (Dixon, 2013). For instance, the government of Kenya abolished the school fee (Tooley, 
2009), while the state and federal governments of India built more public schools, hired more 
teachers, and passed laws to increase school enrollment (Muralidharan, 2013; Pratham, 2012). At 
the same time, such countries have witnessed a sharp growth in the number of low-cost private 
schools, many of which cater to relatively poor, fee-paying parents. Abolishing the school fee in 
Kenya did not lead fee-paying parents to reject private schools, primarily because of their conviction 
that public schools offered poor instructional quality (Tooley, 2009). The same is true in India: 
Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) surveys1 show that private-school enrollment increased 
from approximately 19% in 2006 to 26% of students in 2011.  
In general, private schools account for at least 20% of the total primary-school enrollment in 
developing countries (Baum et al., 2014), and the growth of this sector has occurred despite 
increased spending on public schooling and near-universal access to free public primary schools 
(Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2016). Fieldwork indicates that low-income parents reject free 
government schools2 and select low-cost private schools for a variety of reasons that range from 
teacher absenteeism and low academic quality in the public sector, to the higher academic quality, 
presence of religious values, and school safety in the private schools (Shakeel & Wolf, forthcoming 
2018).  
                                                          
1 Available at http://www.asercentre.org/ 
2 Evidence exists that even though they are free, most public schools in Liberia charge additional and unauthorized 
fees (The research team, 2017, p. 14). 
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Educational public-private partnerships are a middle ground between public and private schools. 
These public-private partnerships are schools that are publically funded, but operated by private 
organizations. Support for such public-private partnerships3 has recently remerged and rests upon 
the following factors:  
• An increasingly important role of private schools in boosting school enrollment, especially 
for traditionally underserved students (Baum et al., 2014); 
• Increased parental demand for private schools, even after increased government spending 
on public schools and near universal access to them (Glewwe & Muralidharan, 2016);  
• Growth in public-private partnerships for early childhood development interventions 
(Gustafsson-Wright, Smith, & Gardiner, 2016); 
• Non-state actors’ already providing many public education services beyond teacher salaries 
(The research team, 2017, p. 12);   
• Some evidence4 that private (religious and philanthropic) schools fare better in learning 
outcomes and teaching in comparison to public schools (Ashley & Wales, 2015). 
Thus, researchers are understandably interested in private-school programs in developing countries. 
Their key question: Which kind of schools are most effective at generating academic achievement 
and /or civic values (Doolittle & Connors, 2001; Friedman & Friedman, 1990; Gutmann, 1999; 
Neal, 2002, Ravitch, 2013)? The evidence from experimental studies shows moderate, aggregate 
benefits of private-school-scholarship interventions on academic achievement in the United States, 
but by contrast, substantial benefits in developing countries (Shakeel, Anderson & Wolf, 2016). 
This is partly due to the larger gap between the quality of public and private schools in poorer 
countries. In both developing and developed nations, however, the parents who select private 
schooling express greater satisfaction with their schools’ quality (Shakeel & Wolf, forthcoming 
2018).  
A recent public-private initiative in Liberia has provided occasion to investigate the results of such 
an experiment through a randomized control trial (RCT). The study looks at the initial effects of 
Liberia’s experiment with enabling private operators to run public schools (Romero, Sandefur, & 
Sandholtz, 2017). Known as the Partnership Schools for Liberia5 (PSL), the program, described in 
full below, funded eight private contractors to manage 93 elementary and middle schools and 
compared the results with those from 93 similar public schools. The authors found that, after one 
year of private management, student learning increased by 60% over peers in comparable public 
schools; teachers were 20 percentage points more likely to be present in PSL schools and 16 
percentage points more likely to be engaged in instruction during class time in a random check; and 
                                                          
3 Although publicly funded options for access to privately administered schooling exist in some parts of the developing 
world (such as school vouchers in Chile), contracting out public schools to private providers is a relatively new 
phenomenon. Some examples include National Rural Support program in Pakistan (Rasmussen et al., 2007), 
concession schools in Bogota, Colombia (Barrera-Osorio, 2006) and Fe Y Alegría in Latin America (Allcott & Ortega, 
2009). 
4 Ashley and Wales (2015) conduct a systematic review of the effect of private schools in developing countries. 
5 A summary of PSL and results of the evaluation were recently highlighted by BBC news. Available at 
https://www.bbc.com/news/amp/business-42413639 
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students in PSL schools spent twice as much time learning each week. The evaluation also found 
that academic performance varied among the eight private contractors, and that the program’s costs 
were high. The PSL program, the research team’s first-year findings, and criticism garnered by the 
report, are explored in depth below. 
 
The Partnership Schools for Liberia 
Liberia offers a unique setting to explore the effects of public-private partnerships in the provision 
of education. Outside donors primarily fund the education system—75% of its $40 million per year 
budget comes from external funding (Romero et al., 2017, p. 12). In addition, the national 
enrollment rate is very low: compulsory education lasts 6 years in Liberia (from age 6-11),6 but only 
38% of  Liberia’s eligible students attend primary school, compared to an average of 90% worldwide 
(The World Bank, 2015). Liberia’s public schools characteristically produce low levels of learning; 
only a quarter of adult women who have completed elementary school can read a full sentence 
(Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services, 2014). Understandably, the demand 
for private schooling is high: approximately half of all enrolled K-12 students attend non-public 
(private, mission and community) schools (Ministry of Education - Republic of Liberia, 2016).  
In September 2016, the Liberian Ministry of Education allowed private-school operators to run 93 
public schools, known as “partnership schools,” in a project called “Partnership Schools in Liberia” 
(PSL).  
PSL’s design includes the following elements: 
• Contractors. Six of the eight selected contractors (YMCA, Omega, BRAC, Rising Academy, 
Street Child and More Than Me) were chosen through a competitive bidding process from 
a total of 11 bids.7 Bridge International Academies was selected outside the process, and 
Stella Maris – also chosen outside of the process - did not complete the contracting process 
and did little work. Only three of the contractors had not previously provided educational 
services in Liberia. 
• Number and location of PSL schools. The Liberian Ministry of Education selected 185 schools 
to be part of the PSL program. The private-school contactors identified pairs of similar 
schools that they were willing to run, and one school from each pair was randomly selected 
for the contractor to actually run. The 93 schools that had been randomly selected served as 
the treatment group (and the other school in the pair that was not randomly selected served 
as control schools). While all schools in the PSL program were similar to one another, they 
were more privileged than the average Liberian school in several ways: PSL cohorts (both 
treatment and control) had higher staffing levels, better infrastructure, and better access to 
roads. (Romero et al., 2017, p. 8).  
                                                          
6 Available at http://uis.unesco.org/country/LR 
7 Available at http://moe.gov.lr/partnership-schools-for-liberia/ 
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Under the terms of PSL, the contractors maintain the following responsibilities:  
• Control over some school inputs, such as books, computers and uniforms. PSL schools could 
also provide extra-curricular activities. 
• Open admissions. The contractors could not engage in selective student admissions. 
• Professional development for teachers. The contractors could invest in teacher professional 
development. 
• Instruction from the Liberian national curriculum. Although PSL schools teach the Liberian 
national curriculum, the contractors could and often do surpass the requirements through 
additional hours and/or subjects. 
• Annual assessments. Regulations for annual testing and reporting of results apply to PSL 
schools. 
• Reports on attendance. The PSL schools are required to provide data to the government on 
daily teacher and student attendance similar to non-PSL students. 
• Adhere to the government’s hiring and dismissal policies. As the teachers in PSL and non-PSL 
schools are public servants, no school has authority to dismiss a teacher. Teacher 
accountability in PSL schools is only through monitoring and support.  
The government, for its part: 
• Owns and maintains all school buildings. The government owns and finances the schools. PSL 
schools remain within public sector and are free to all students.  
• Guarantees one teacher per grade for PSL schools. The government assures PSL schools one 
teacher per grade and pays teachers’ salaries. 
At the same time, the differences between PSL and the control schools are important: 
• PSL schools have first choice from among recent teacher graduates. The PSL program evaluation 
lasts for three years. PSL contractors have the first pick of new teacher training graduates 
throughout this period. Note that recent teachers, however talented, do not necessarily 
constitute superior teachers.  
• PSL schools receive an additional $50/per pupil. The per-pupil expenditure in Liberian public 
schools is approximately $50. The government provides an additional $50 per-pupil to PSL 
intervention schools.8  
• PSL schools are allowed to cap class sizes. The MOU between PSL contractors and the 
government authorizes contractors to cap class size at 65. One contractor - Bridge 
International Academies – is authorized to cap the class size at 55, but capped them at 45 in 
most cases. Local media reports indicate that there had been more than 75 students in a class 
in some schools prior to the intervention (Mukpo, 2017). 
                                                          
8 Note that Bridge International Academy and Stella Maris, who did not apply to be part of the PSL program through 
a competitive process, do not receive the additional $50 per student a year. 
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As part of the PSL program, an external, independent evaluation led by the Center for Global 
Development and Innovations for Poverty Action informs the public and the government about the 
program’s impacts during its first three years.  
In September 2017, the research team from Center for Global Development released preliminary 
findings from PSL’s first year of operation.9 What were the initial program effects, and are they 
transferable to other schools in Liberia or elsewhere?  
The research team found the following: 
• Positive academic results. The intervention produced statistically significant and positive results 
on student learning as measured by test scores. The estimated average effect of the 
intervention, measured across all providers, was 0.18 s.d. in English and 0.18 s.d. in 
mathematics. Note that the tests were created by the researchers evaluating the PSL, and 
were based on commonly used international assessments—the Early Grade Reading 
Assessment (ERGA), Early Grade Mathematics Assessment (EGMA), Uwezo, and Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) assessment.10 The researchers 
calculate that, “The gains are the equivalent of 0.56 additional years of schooling for English 
and 0.66 years of schooling for math.”  
• Positive effects on teachers. Teachers in PSL schools had better attendance: during a random 
check, teachers in PSL schools were 20 percentage points more likely to be present. Teachers’ 
engagement in instruction during class time also improved: teachers in PSL schools were 16 
percentage points more likely to engage with students in lectures and discussions or to 
monitor students’ progress. The time devoted to instruction also increased twofold in PSL 
schools. 
• Variability between providers. The small sample size (only eight contractors) and the differences 
in their prior experience in Liberia make it difficult to draw relevant policy conclusions from 
variability in performance. However, the research team found that providers clustered into 
three distinct groups, based on the improved academic achievement of their students. The 
first group produced an increase of 0.27 s.d. on all subjects (YMCA, Rising Academies, Street 
Child and Bridge International Academies). The second group produced an increase of 0.15 
s.d. (BRAC and More than Me). The third group produced an increase of 0.01 s.d., i.e., the 
result was statistically null (Omega and Stella Maris). 
• High cost of intervention. The average per-pupil cost in Liberian public schools is $50. The PSL 
schools were provided an extra $50 per-pupil, as the government determined that $100 per-
pupil expenditure11 was a realistic medium-term goal (Werner, 2017). The government plans 
to increase the per-pupil subsidy in the second year of PSL and also include a meal program 
currently not covered by the contractors. But the research team estimates that some 
                                                          
9 It is common practice among economists and program evaluators to set out their findings in the format of a working 
paper. Such a procedure allows academic feedback and suggestions for possible improvements in writing and empirical 
analysis before the paper finally goes through the publication process in a peer-reviewed journal. 
10 For additional details see online Appendix F of Romero et al. (2017). 
11 World Bank data shows that this is comparable to per-pupil expenditure by governments such as Tanzania in 2014, 
Pakistan in 2015, Ghana in 2014 and India in 2010. 
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contractors exceeded the amount provided by the government, perhaps by as much as $600 
per pupil. More importantly, the research team does not find a clear correlation between 
higher per-student costs and higher learning gains. For instance, Bridge International 
Academies had a $663 per-pupil ex-ante budget, and Youth Movement for Collective Action 
a $57 per-pupil ex-ante budget. As discussed before, both of these contractors are in the 
group that produced an increase of 0.27 s.d. in all subjects. However, one should be cautious 
about drawing long-term conclusions about the intervention’s costs. This is because the 
researchers did not have full access to providers’ actual costs, nor did the researchers know 
which of the costs are fixed costs (e.g. one-time costs, such as improving the school building) 
and which are variable costs (e.g. costs that will need to be paid indefinitely, such as salaries).   
Is the Partnership Schools in Liberia model transferable to other contexts – both in other parts of 
Liberia and in other countries? It may be too early to tell, for the following reasons: 
• First-year findings. First-year evaluations, in general, only allow modest conclusions. For 
instance, the impacts of school vouchers initially dip but generally improve year on year 
(Shakeel, Anderson, & Wolf 2016). Any educational intervention affects household and 
school-level inputs in ways that affect the program’s outcomes (Glewwe & Muralidharan, 
2016). The third-year findings will therefore be more informative for policymakers as they 
contemplate scaling up PSL or transferring the model to other countries.  
• Limited geography. For reasons noted above, the Liberian government restricted the initial 
phase of the project to well-traveled areas. It is not clear whether partnership schools in less 
populated areas can attract high-quality contractors. 
• Teaching supply. The Liberian government gave PSL schools first choice in hiring recent 
graduates of teacher training institutions. The researchers estimate that approximately half 
of the increased learning gains were due to changes in the composition of teachers at PSL 
schools.12 It is therefore not clear whether such a policy could continue under a scaled-up 
version of PSL.  
In sum, the PSL project clearly improved learning in the contracted schools. The PSL schools were 
located in areas with better road connectivity and the program enjoyed unique financial and teacher-
supply support from the government.  Further, it should be noted that spillover effects—that could 
be both negative and/or positive—are not accounted for. For instance, the largest contractor, Bridge 
International Academy, dismissed many of their teachers and hired newly-trained teachers.13 This 
may have resulted in weaker teachers working in other Liberian schools (an unintended negative 
consequence for those students). In contrast, recent research shows that there are spillover effects 
for younger siblings when their older siblings experience a higher quality teacher; thus, there might 
                                                          
12 Note that the researchers measured this by using the teachers’ age, and found a large impact of having younger 
teachers at PSL schools. 
13 Note that it is unclear the circumstances in which this happened. As stated above, PSL teachers are public servants 
and the government pays their salaries. However, the data from Bridge Academies International shows that many of 
the teachers employed at Bridge schools at the beginning of the year were not working at the Bridge schools by the end 
of the year.   
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also be positive spillovers within PSL students’ families.14 Therefore, policymakers should be 
cautioned against scaling the program until it has been piloted in average Liberian schools, evaluated 
thoroughly through a longer time frame, and the effects of the program are studied across the entire 
school system (or at least nearby public schools). 
 
Klees’s Critique 
The National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education at the Teachers College, Columbia 
University studies, and is generally critical of,15 educational public-private partnerships. In October 
2017, the Center released a working paper authored by Steven Klees (University of Maryland) that 
critiques the research team’s evaluation and the PSL model itself.  
Klees (2017) criticizes the first-year evaluation report on the following methodological grounds:  
• The researchers’ preferred specification estimating the effects of the PSL program on student outcomes 
did not include student pre-test scores. It is common to employ multiple model specifications in 
empirical analysis. For their evaluation of the PSL program, the research team used four 
different model specifications to estimate the effects of PSL schools on student outcomes: 
(1) no controls, (2) adding a fixed effect for school pairs, (3) adding16 student and school 
controls, and (4) adding students’ pre-test scores.  The evaluation team reports all of their 
estimates, but focus the majority of their analysis on specification 3. Klee argues that 
specification 4 should be the focus of the analysis. Estimates from specification 4 reduce the 
estimated effect of the PSL from a 66% annual increase in English and 56% increase in math 
to a 42% increase in English and 50% increase in math.  Klee argues that specification 4 is 
the preferred specification because it controls for previous student pre-test scores and that 
not doing so is “an extremely unusual procedure.”  The researchers who conducted the 
evaluation of PSL argue that they focus on specification 3 because the pre-test scores were 
collected relatively late, after students have already showed some learning gains (and 
therefore, specification 4 under-estimates the actual effect of the PSL program). The 
researchers support this claim by showing that there is a significant difference between 
treatment and control students in reading and math at the baseline, but not in any time-
invariant student characteristics or on abstract reasoning (which is less malleable than 
reading and math scores). The researchers also show that difference between the treatment 
and control group at baseline grows based on when the treatment group’s test score were 
collected.17  Klee dismisses this argument, stating that it is “based on very little evidence” (4).  
                                                          
14 Javaeria A. Qureshi, “Siblings, Teachers, and Spillovers on Academic Achievement,” Journal of Human Resources 53, 
no. 1 (2018): 272–297. 
15 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2016/07/14/why-the-movement-to-privatize-public-
education-is-a-very-bad-idea/?utm_term=.1e7a9eb338b3 
16 Note that each specification adds additional elements to the previous specification. 
17 That is, there is a larger gap between the treatment and control group if the treatment group was tested at the end of 
the data-collection period than if the data was collected at the beginning of the data-collection period.  
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• The researchers’ analysis of which factors contributed to gains in student learning is essentially 
correlational and ad hoc. Klee argues that the section in the evaluation report that attempts to 
understand the mechanisms behind the changes in student learning is “completely invalid” 
because it is “ad hoc” and only “statistical correlations” (6). It should be noted that the 
authors of the evaluation do not claim that this section is a causal model; rather they attempt 
to address “which changes mattered for learning outcomes…as best as possible,” and that 
their results are suggestive (36).   
Klees also criticizes the PSL model on ideological grounds. Here, his primary objection is that there 
is no need for educational public-private partnerships, since government schools can themselves 
implement reforms. PSL’s gains in test scores, he writes, derive from changes “that could be easily 
implemented in government schools without any need for outsourcing to the private sector.” He 
repeats this point several times: “The government can easily change the curriculum to have teachers 
in regular government schools spend more instructional hours on English and math;” “the Ministry 
could implement smaller class sizes in government schools;” the government could better train new 
teachers (8, 9). He concludes,  
It is reasonable to assume that the gains in test scores has nothing to do with the 
privatization model of the PSL. Rather, longer hours, focusing teaching on English 
and math, smaller class sizes, better teacher training, and more access to basic inputs 
are more than reasonable explanations of why PSL students scored higher—all factors 
that have nothing to do with privatization and could easily be implemented in 
government schools throughout the nation (9).  
And, “PSL is a waste of resources. There is a huge international literature that clearly answers the 
question of whether private schools are better than public schools…They are not” (13). Finally, he 
writes, “[These are] changes that could easily be made in regular public schools” (14). 
Klees’s comments here depart from the empirical record, ignoring much of the history of education 
in developing countries as well as the research record on the positive effects of non-public schools. 
For example, his call for an increase in teacher salaries as a cure to teacher absenteeism (Klees, 10) 
was tried in Indonesia in 2009-2012, which doubled its teacher salaries unconditionally - to no effect 
on student achievement (de Ree et al., 2017). The teacher salaries in India are in the 90th percentile 
of public-sector salaries, and yet teacher absenteeism is substantial. Moreover, random visits to 
government schools in India reveal that teachers are often engaged in non-teaching activities during 
teaching hours (Kremer et al., 2005; Muralidharan et al, 2014). It has been observed in prior 
interventions in various countries that a well-designed program with positive impacts implemented 
by non-profit organizations may fail when implemented by government at a large scale (Romero et 
al., 51). Why? Because the identity of the organization running the program is the largest predictor 
of its effectiveness (concerning its impact within studies of similar programs) (Vivalt, 2015). A 
government-led program would likely differ in its impacts from the PSL model. Klees’s assertion that 
governments can implement the same intervention to the same effect may not hold in the real world.  
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More broadly, Klees neither references nor rebuts systematic reviews carried out by the United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) that provide ample evidence for the 
positive effects of private schools in developing countries.18 Klees does not cite field experiments in 
developing countries that have found a clear, private school advantage based on student 
achievement, teaching, infrastructure, and other measures,19 nor four recent experimental studies 
(two in India and two in Colombia) that show positive and cost-effective academic results from 
private school vouchers (Shakeel, Anderson & Wolf, 2016).    
Klees does raise the problem of cost; he estimates that the PSL intervention and its evaluation 
amounted to $25 million for the three-year period. This is no meagre investment and should not be 
entered lightly. Klees is also right to call for more stringent cost-effectiveness analysis in the future.  
 
Concluding Thoughts 
The Partnership Schools in Liberia represents the most recent experiment with non-public 
educational delivery in the developing world. The working paper released by the Center for Global 
Development and Innovations for Poverty Action examines PSL’s first year only; evaluations in Years 
2 and 3 will offer more insights as the program stabilizes. The working paper and the program itself 
have been criticized by another, prominent institution. However, whichever method is used to 
analyze program effects, it does seem that PSL led to learning gains and that the intervention is costly 
in its first year. The evaluation reports from subsequent years will indicate whether the gains are 
sustainable and at what cost.  
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